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6.1  Introduction 
According to recent surveys, more than half of private pension plans 
and a significant fraction of public plans in the United States today are 
explicitly integrated with social security.  The manifest purposes of this 
integration are (1) to ensure retirement income adequacy for all covered 
employees and (2) to ensure retirement income equity, defined as equal 
total replacement rates for all  employees regardless of  salary level. 
Integrated plans seek to achieve these goals by taking into account the 
amount that the retiree will be receiving from social security and then 
providing a benefit from the plan sufficient to produce a combined plan- 
plus-social  security benefit that  constitutes  approximately the same 
percentage of the employee’s preretirement compensation independent 
of his position on the pay scale. 
Virtually all of the existing literature on integration and integrated 
plans has been concerned with the issues of adequacy and equity of 
integrated plans versus nonintegrated plans. The focus of this study is 
quite different. One of  the primary  side effects of plan integration is 
the alteration or the change in the risk-bearing relationships among 
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employees, employers, and the government vis-a-vis social security 
benefits. In effect, an integrated plan causes the employer to insure his 
covered employees against adverse changes in the social security ben- 
efit to which they will be entitled. Specifically, the employer provides 
a contingent liability against the firm in return for the claim which the 
employee currently has on the social security system, and thus sub- 
stitutes in part the risks inherent in holding liabilities of  the firm for 
the risks inherent in holding the claim on the social security system. 
There  exists in  the United  States today  considerable uncertainty 
surrounding the future structure of the social security system and the 
level of benefits which that system will provide. The issue of  social 
security risk and schemes for providing insurance against that risk is 
therefore of  substantive importance from a policy perspective. Prior 
analyses of integration have addressed the issues of retirement-income 
adequacy and equity of  integrated plans exclusively and thereby left 
the  risk-sharing  implications  of  integration  as  “unintended  conse- 
quences”  of  those  schemes.  We  therefore have chosen to focus on 
these risk-sharing aspects. 
In two previous papers, one of  us (Merton 1983a,b) addressed the 
issues of retirement income risk and adequacy and the role of  social 
security.  The specific normative questions analyzed  in those papers 
were whether social security should be a mandatory or voluntary sys- 
tem, how  it  should be funded, and  what  form  contributions and/or 
benefits should take. This paper, while related to the previous ones in 
its general perspective and methodology, focuses on the positive ques- 
tions about integration surrounding the interaction between employer- 
provided pensions and social security. 
The plan of the paper is as follows: in section 6.2, we briefly explain 
how integration  works.  In  section 6.3  we  present  a stylized formal 
model of an integrated plan which seeks to explore and highlight the 
insurance and risk-sharing aspects of  integration and to determine its 
costs and benefits. The model uses the tools and the analytical frame- 
work of contingent claims analysis in order to quantify the trade-offs 
involved. In section 6.4 we extend the formal model in several direc- 
tions in order to add greater realism. Finally, the concluding section 
summarizes our main results and presents  our agenda for future re- 
search on the integration issue. 
6.2  How Integration Works 
As noted, the general purpose of integration is to provide a retiree 
with a combined benefit that will constitute approximately the same 
percentage of the employee’s preretirement compensation independent 
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is highly progressive, or tilted toward the lower end of the pay scale, 
the effect of integration is to provide a benefit from the employer which 
is tilted in the opposite direction. There are two main approaches that 
can be and are used to produce this result. One is the “offset” approach 
and the other the “excess”  approach. 
In offset plans, a portion of an individual’s social security benefit is 
subtracted from the benefit to which he is entitled according to some 
defined benefit formula to determine the amount the employer will have 
to provide.  Thus a typical  defined benefit plan  might provide for a 
benefit which is equal to 2%  of the worker’s final average salary per 
year of service. For a worker with 25 years of service and a final average 
salary of $24,000, this plan leads to an annual benefit of $12,000 per 
year. If the social security benefit to which that worker is entitled comes 
to $7,000, and if there is a full 100% offset under the plan, the employer 
would have to pay the worker only ($12,000 - 7,000 or) $5,000 per 
year. The Internal Revenue Service, however, does not currently permit 
a full 100% offset. The maximum allowed offset presently is 83Y3%  of 
an employee’s primary insurance amount (PIA). Whatever the offset 
percentage is, once the benefit payable by the employer is determined, 
it is then frozen at that level throughout the retirement period and will 
not be lowered if there are subsequent increases in social security. The 
effect of an offset plan is illustrated in table 6.1, which is taken from 
Schulz and Leavitt (1983). 
The table illustrates the effect on total replacement rates of an in- 
tegrated  plan  with  an  83V3%  offset. The last column  of  table 6.1A 
illustrates the “progressivity” of the tilt associated with social security 
replacement rates, falling from 70% for the lowest-paid worker to 9% 
for the highest paid. Column 5 in table 6.1B illustrates the impact of 
the social security offset. Through the offset, the lowest-paid workers 
in effect lose all of  their private pension, while the highest-paid retain 
almost all.  The ultimate  impact  of  integration  is  to make  the total 
replacement rates shown in column 7 more equal across salary levels 
than they otherwise would be. 
The other form of integration is the so-called excess approach. Unlike 
offset plans, excess plans do not directly use social security benefits 
in calculating pension benefits. Instead they use social security con- 
tributions or,  to be more  precise,  the taxable wage base for social 
security. Plan benefits are computed and paid only on earnings in excess 
of an “integration level,” which is directly related to the social security 
taxable wage base (also called “covered compensation”).  Under de- 
fined benefit plans, the pension benefit accrual rate is applied only to 
earnings in excess of the plan integration level. In defined contribution 
plans, the contribution rate is applied only to earnings in excess of the 
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Table 6.1  Effect of  an Offset Plan on Replacement Rates 
A.  Social Security Benefits and Replacement Rates for Workers 
Retiring at Age 65 in 1982” 
Social 
Social  Security 
Average Annual  Final Year’s  Security  Replacement 
Earningsb  Earnings  Benefit  RateC 
($)  ($1  ($)  (%) 
Worker Id  6,000  6,599  4,611  70  Worker 1 
Worker Ze  12,000  13,198  7,149  54  Worker 2 
Worker 3f  22,540  29,700  8,148  27  Worker 3 
Worker 49  67,620  89,100  8,148  9  Worker 4 
aAssumed to retire at the beginning of 1982. 
bAverage of highest 5 years of earnings, which in these hypothctical examples are the last 5 
years. 
“Benefit divided by final year’s earnings. 
dAnnual earnings are assumed to be $5,429 in the fourth year before retirement. Earnings 
are assumed to change at a rate of  5%  per year. 
eAnnual earnings are assumed to be $10,858 in the fourth year before retirement. Earnings 
are assumed to change at a rate of 5% per year. 
Worker earns the taxable wage base in all years. 
gWorker earns three times the taxable wage base in all years. 
plans, contributions on earnings below the integration level, while not 
zero, are lower than they are on the earnings above the integration 
level. Excess plans have a similar effect to offset plans on the profile 
of combined replacement rates. 
It should be clear that offset plans are by their nature defined benefit 
plans, while in the case of defined contribution plans the excess ap- 
proach is the only one which can be used to perform integration. In 
the stylized model which we present in the next section of the paper, 
we  assume for simplicity a defined benefit plan  with a 100% social 
security offset. The same mode of analysis can be applied to examine 
the effects of an excess plan. 
6.3  A Formal Model of Pension Integration 
To analyze the effects of integration, we first describe the equivalent 
nonintegrated  plan to be used as a basis for comparison. In a nonin- 
tegrated pension plan, the firm’s payments to retirees are independent 
of the payments made by the social security system. We  will denote 
social security payments  at time  t  and  S,.  B  will  denote the firm’s 
promised payments in the nonintegrated plan, the level of which, we 151  Pension Plan Integration As Insurance Against Social Security Risk 
B.  Pension Benefits, Total Benefits, and Replacement  Rates for 
Workers in a Pension Plan with an 83%% Offseth 
Gross 
Benefit  Pension  Total 
Prior  Social  Final Pension  Replace-  Total  Replace- 
to  Security  Offset  =  Benefit =  ment  Benefit  ment 
Offset  Benefit  (2)  x  333  max [O, (1) - (3)l  Rate'  (2) + (4)  Rate' 
($1  6)  ($1  ($1  (%o)  ($)  (%o) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
3930  4,611  3,841  0  0  451  1  70 
6,000  7,149  5,955  45  i  7,194  55 
11,268  8,148  6,787  4,481  15  12,629  43 
33,804  8,148  6,787  27,017  30  35,165  40 
~~~  ~  ~  ~ 
Source: Schulz and Leavit (1983), p.  11. 
hCalculations assume workers retire at age 65  in  1982. Calculations  also assume that plan 
provides a benefit equal to 50% of  final average earnings, minus 83%%  of social security benefits. 
Final average earnings represent the average of the highest 5 years, which in these hypothetical 
cases are the last 5 years. See table 6.1A for the value of the high-5 average and final year's 
earnings in each case. 
'Benefit divided by final year's earnings. 
]Less than  1%. 
will assume, is currently known. Once the individual retires, the stream 
of total income will be B + ST+r  where T is the date of retirement and 
7 > 0. 
Our stylized integrated plan involves an offset provision: once social 
security payments exceed a stipulated minimum level, further increases 
in those benefits entitle the firm to reduce benefits paid via the pension 
fund. The offset provisions of integrated plans thus shift a portion of 
the risk and return of uncertain future social security payments from 
workers to employers. S, evolves stochastically over time since social 
security benefits are linked to uncertain future wage or price levels and 
are subject to unforeseen legislative changes. 
In practice, the offset is less than one-for-one, so that total benefits 
(i.e.,  pension  plus  social security) increase  with  the level of  social 
security payments. For analytic simplicity, we first compare the polar 
cases of fully integrated plans that incorporate one-for-one offset pro- 
visions with fully nonintegrated plans.  In section 6.4, we show how 
the analysis is modified to accommodate partially integrated plans. 
Fully integrated plans guarantee workers a minimum combined re- 
tirement income from social security and pension payments of F  dollars 
per period. At the date of retirement, T, if social security payments fall 
short of F, the employer is obliged to pay retirees F - ST dollars in 
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dollar increase in the initial retirement year’s social security payment, 
S,,  reduces the employer’s required payment by an equal amount. In 
this regime, employers capture the entire benefit of increases in social 
security. Once ST = F, however, the employer’s obligation is reduced 
to zero, so that workers capture the benefits of further increases in 
social security.  Total retirement income at  T in  the integrated plan 
equals the maximum of the guaranteed floor or current social security 
benefits, that is, max (F, S,). 
An important feature of integrated plans as currently implemented 
is that the employer’s stream of pension obligations is fixed at time T. 
Future increases or decreases in social security benefits which occur 
after commencement of the retirement period do not induce offsetting 
changes in employer-provided pension payments. Thus, as with a non- 
integrated  plan, the employee receives a fixed life annuity from his 
employer at retirement. Unlike the nonintegrated plan, the level of the 
fixed annuity payments in the integrated plan, max (0,F -  S,), depends 
upon the level of the social security payment in the year of retirement, 
Sp  The total retirement income from social security and private pension 
received by the employee in year T of his retirement is given by ST+T 
+ max (0,F -  ST). 
This institutionally established feature of integrated plans leads to a 
simplification of the analysis by permitting the transformation of what 
would appear to be a dynamic multiperiod problem into a one-period 
problem. To see this and prepare for the analysis to follow, we develop 
the valuation  equations for future social security payments and life 
annuities. If we denote by g the expected (real) rate of growth of social 
security payments, then it follows that 
(1)  E, (S,)  = StdT-I), 
where E, is the conditional expectation operator, conditional on infor- 
mation available at time t. If there were a traded financial claim which 
paid its owner $S, at time T, then its market price at time t would be 
E,(S,)exp[  -a(T - t)  1, where  01  is the  market equilibrium expected 
rate of  return for a security in this risk class. It follows from (1) that 
the present value of the social security payment at time Tcan be written 
as 
(2)  Vo = SocST, 
where 6 = a -  g. 
curity benefits can be written as 
At retirement, the present value of the worker’s lifetime social se- 
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where  Pr(t) is  the probability  that  the retiree  is alive  t  years  after 
retiring. If the mortality table remains stable over time, then from (1) 
we can rewrite (3) as 
(3 ’) 
where h(6)  does not depend on ST or time. Similarly, at retirement, the 
present value of a riskless life annuity of $A per year can be written 
as 
(4)  PV(A) = Ah(r), 
where h( ) is the identical function as in (3’) and Y is the riskless real 
rate of interest. 
At the employee’s retirement, STwill  be known, and hence, the value 
of employer-provided benefits at time T can be written as 
(5)  PV= max(0,F - ST)&). 
Thus, because there are no further adjustments to these payments as 
the result of subsequent post-retirement changes in social security ben- 
efits, the analysis of this type of integrated plan need only focus on a 
single date, T. The multiple-period framework required to analyze al- 
ternative versions of integration is presented in section 6.4. 
Armed with these basic valuation relations, we turn now to the changes 
in risk bearing caused by a change from a nonintegrated to an integrated 
plan. From the perspective of the employer, the firm changes from a 
commitment to pay $B a year during the retirement period to a com- 
mitment to pay $max(O,F - ST). When the worker retires, the firm 
knows precisely what the level of  annuity payments will be in either 
plan. At that time, from (4), the value of the liability is Bh(r) for the 
nonintegrated  plan and max  (0,F - S,)h(r) for the integrated plan. 
However, when viewed from dates earlier than T, the level of annuity 
payments for the integrated plan is uncertain because ST is unknown. 
A convenient interpretation of the provisions of the integrated plan can 
be used to determine the value of  the firm’s pension liability prior to 
the worker’s retirement. The structure of the contingent liability pay- 
ment, max (0,F -  ST),  is formally equivalent to a European put option 
of maturity date T with an exercise price F on a stock with a price at 
time  T given by Sp  This equivalence permits the use of  established 
results from the put option pricing literature to value the obligations 
of the employer under the provisions of the integrated plan.2 
The employer’s major policy variable under an integrated plan is the 
level of guaranteed combined retirement income, F. To focus on the 
risk-sharing aspects of  integration, we impose the constraint that the 
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of  any retiree be equal for integrated  and comparable nonintegrated 
plans. That is, the present value or cost of the two plans is the same. 
In the nonintegrated plan, the worker receives from the firm a stream 
of payments in retirement of B per year. From (4),  the present value 
of this liability to the firm at time T is Bh(r).  If today’s calendar date 
is normalized to zero and we neglect pre-retirement mortality, then the 
current value of this liability is Bh(r)e  rT. 
In an integrated plan, the worker receives from the firm a stream of 
payments of  max(0,F - S,)  per year and the corresponding present 
value  of  this  liability to the firm at time  T is max  (0,F - S,)h(r). 
Neglecting pre-retirement mortality, the current value of  this liability 
is P(F,S,,T)h(r) where P  denotes the current (time 0) value of a Eu- 
ropean put option that gives its “owner”  (the employee) the right to 
sell the social security payment at T for F, when the social security 
benefit level is currently at So. 
Under the hypothesized condition that the current value of the pen- 
sion cost to the employer is the same for the integrated and noninte- 
grated plans, it follows that F must be chosen so that 
(6)  P(F,S,,n = Be-‘,. 
Given a valuation formula for the put, (6) can be used to solve for the 
level of the floor on combined retirement income, F, that equates the 
present value of the firm’s obligations in the integrated and noninte- 
grated plans. 
From the viewpoint of the employee, the effect on risk bearing of 
changing from a nonintegrated to an integrated pension plan is to pro- 
vide the employee with an implicit insurance scheme. To see this, we 
compare the value of the worker’s combined social security and private 
pension benefits at retirement for the nonintegrated plan to the cor- 
responding value at retirement for the integrated plan. From (3’) and 
(4), the value at time T under the nonintegrated plan can be written as 
(7)  S&(S)  -I- Bh(r) = [h(S) - h(r)  ]ST + h(r){S, + B}. 
Similarly, the value at time T under the integrated plan can be written 
as 
(8)  S&(6)  + max(0,F - ST)h(r) = [h(6) - h(r)  ]ST 
+ h(r){S, + max(0,F - S,)} 
= “6)  - h(r)lS, 
+ h(r){max(F,ST)l. 
By inspection of  (7) and (S), the difference in benefits to the employee 
between the two plans is the difference in the terms in curly brackets. 
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of  ST, plus contingent lifetime annuity payments from the firm equal 
to the shortfall, if  any, between ST and the guaranteed combined in- 
come, F. The worker, therefore, receives insurance (the put option) 
from the employer against low levels of the social security benefit. If 
ST is below the “insured value,”  F, the employer-provided insurance 
policy pays off and makes up the differen~e.~ 
As is evident from (7), the nonintegrated plan also provides a “floor” 
on combined retirement income, namely, B.  However, if the floor F in 
the integrated plan is chosen so as to satisfy (6), then it is straightfor- 
ward to show F >  B whenever B >  0 and So >  0. Moreover, in practical 
cases, F >> B. That is, the combined minimum guaranteed level of 
benefits in the integrated plan will be much higher than in the nonin- 
tegrated plan. By more formal measures of risk such as the variance 
of the employee’s retirement benefit, it is straightforward to show that 
var(ST + B) > var [max(F,S,)]. Thus, it is appropriate to characterize 
the change from a nonintegrated to an integrated plan as providing the 
employee with insurance and reducing the uncertainty about his com- 
bined retirement income. 
The insurance provided by integration does not come to the employee 
for “free.”  The price paid is that the employee gives up his noninte- 
grated plan claim of B in return for the integrated plan’s insurance on 
the value of  Sp By inspection of  (7) and (8), the employee will, ex 
post, be worse off in an integrated plan if ST  >  F -  B.  Thus, it cannot 
be claimed, as a normative matter, that all risk-averse employees would 
prefer  an integrated  plan  over a  comparable-in-value nonintegrated 
plan. From (6) and the well-known put option price property that 0 I 
dP/dF 5 crT,  it does follow, however, that d(F -  B) / dB > 0. Hence, 
for a fixed probability distribution for ST, the larger is B, the smaller 
is the probability that the worker will experience (ex post) regret for 
having chosen an integrated plan over a nonintegrated one. 
To  obtain solutions for F in (6) that are amenable to comparative- 
static analysis, we continue the examination of the properties of  in- 
tegrated plans under the simplifying assumption that S, follows a geo- 
metric Brownian m~tion.~  That is, the dynamics of S, are assumed to 
be described by the stochastic differential equation 
dS = gSdt + US  dz,  (9) 
where, as previously defined, g is the expected rate of growth of social 
security payments; cr2 is the instantaneous constant variance rate for 
the percentage change in S;  and dz denotes a Wiener process. 
From (2) and (9), arguments along the lines presented in Constan- 
tinides (1978) can be used to show that the put option price can be 
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(10) 
where 
P(F, So, T) = FrrT[1  -  N(d,)] - S,e-“[1  - N(d,)1 
ln(SdF)  + (r - 6 + 1/2 u2)T 
u  .\rT 
d, = 
d2  = dl -  (T  .\rT 
N(  .) is the cumulative standard-normal distribution function. 
Equation (10) is formally equivalent to the well-known Black-Scholes 
(1973) put option formula on a dividend-paying stock. The “dividend 
adjustment,” 6, reflects the difference in the expected rate of “capital 
gains” on S,  g, and the total required rate of return, a,  given its risk 
characteristics. Some relevant comparative-static properties of P(F, So, 
IJ are presented in table 6.2. Equation (10) can be used to determine 
the floor levels, F, that equate P(F, So, T)  and Be-rT. 
There is considerable controversy over the issue of whether benefits 
accruing under a defined benefit plan ought to be viewed as fixed in 
real or nominal terms  .5 While this controversy has potentially signifi- 
cant implications for the magnitude of  the effects we are examining, 
it is essentially unrelated to our main thrust. However, with this con- 
troversy in mind, we do present tables of  analysis which reflect the 
two polar extremes: (1) the case in which employer-provided benefits 
are fixed in real terms (i.e., indexed to the price level), and (2) the case 
in which they are fixed in nominal terms, as argued by Bulow (1982). 
By analyzing the extremes we are in essence covering all the cases in 
between as well. 
Table 6.3 presents floor levels corresponding to several possible com- 
binations of social security and nonintegrated benefit levels. The table 
presents results for case 1, in which both employer-provided and social 
security benefits are interpreted as real obligations. Column 1 of table 
6.3  contains  hypothetical  employer-provided  benefits  of  various 
amounts. Column 2 of table 6.3 contains the expected real social se- 
curity benefit, which we fix at $10,000. Therefore, the different rows 
of table 6.3 may be interpreted as corresponding to different scenarios 
Table 6.2  Change in Floor Income of Integrated Plan in Response to 
Increase in Various Parameters 
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Total  Floor Benefit for 
Social  Nonintegrated  Corresponding Integrated  Plan 
Benefit  [(I) + (2)l 
Security  Benefit  (4)  (5)  (6) 



















A.  Time to retirement  15 years 
10,000  10,000  0  0  0 
10,oOu  IO, 100  9,880  9,205  7,955 
10,000  10,500  10,480  10,205  9,435 
10,000  11,000  11,000*  10,900  10,400 
10,000  15,000  15,000*  15,000*  14,990 
10,000  20,000  20,000*  20,000*  20,000* 
1u,ooo  10,000  0  0  0 
10,000  10,100  9,765  8,840  7,260 
10,OOO  10,500  10,450  10,005  8,930 
10,000  11,000  11,OOO*  10,785  10,015 
10,000  15,000  15,000*  15,000*  14,935 
10,000  20,000  20,000*  20,000*  20,000* 
10,OOo  10,000  0  0  0 
10,000  10,100  9,660  8,545  6,725 
10,000  10,500  10,415  9,825  8,515 
10,000  11,000  10,990  10,670  9,675 
10,000  15,000  15,000*  15,000*  14,855 
10,000  20,000  20,000*  20,OOo*  19,990 
B.  Time to retirement 25 years 
C.  Time to retirement 35 years 
*In these cases the value to the employee of receiving social security payments in 
excess of the floor, while always positive, has a present value of less than $5. 
in which private (nonintegrated) pension plan benefits as a fraction of 
social security benefits differ widely. These comparisons are of interest 
because  (as demonstrated  in table  6.  l), employer-provided pension 
payments for low-income individuals are small relative to social se- 
curity, while for high-income individuals, private pension benefits ex- 
ceed social security, at least under the assumption that they are real. 
The third  column  of  table 6.3 is  simply the  sum of  private  plus 
expected social security benefits in the nonintegrated plan. This value 
is a useful benchmark against which to compare the guaranteed floor 
benefit of  the integrated plan.  Under certainty (a = 0),  and with no 
expected real growth in social security benefits, a = r  = 6, and the 
guaranteed floor would be exactly B  + So, which is in fact column 3. 
Of course, ST is uncertain; hence, with 6 = r, column 3 is interpreted 
as the expected  level of  total combined benefits in the nonintegrated 158  Robert C. Merton, Zvi Bodie, and Alan J. Marcus 
plan.6 Column 3 and columns 4-6  compare the guaranteed minimum 
incomes  in  the integrated plan  with this combined  expected benefit 
from the nonintegrated plan. 
Columns 4-6  are the minimum real income levels that the employer 
would provide in an integrated plan with the same present value as the 
nonintegrated plan, computed using standard deviations for the real 
percentage change in S, of  1%,  2.5%,  and 5%  per year. Panel A of the 
table uses a time to retirement of  15 years, while panels B and C use 
25 and 35 years, respectively. 
To facilitate the comparison of integrated and nonintegrated benefits, 
note that the annuity levels in  column 3 are equal to the guaranteed 
annuity the employer would provide if  the employee would assign all 
his rights to future social security benefits to the employer. That is, an 
extreme form of risk shifting would be that the worker transfers all of 
his social security benefits to the employer in return for a guaranteed 
annuity. This sale causes the employer to bear all social security risk 
and to receive all of its benefits. 
What level annuity would the employer offer in return for the social 
security benefit? From (2) and (3’), the current value of the employee’s 
stream of social security benefits is given by Soh(6)e-s7.  From (4), the 
current value of  a life annuity of  $A beginning at time T is Ah(r)e-rT. 
Under the assumed condition of table 6.3 that 6 = r, it follows, there- 
fore, that the level  of  annuity payments,  A, which the firm would 
exchange in return for the employee’s social security benefits is given 
by A  = So. Thus, under the posited conditions, the number reported 
in column 3, B  + So, is the guaranteed annuity level associated with 
the market value of the combined benefits in the nonintegrated plan. 
In actual integrated plans, of course, the worker does not transfer 
all rights to social security benefits: if ST  exceeds F,  the worker collects 
the additional amount ST - F. In effect, the worker retains rights to 
the upper tail of  the social security distribution. Whereas the worker 
would receive a guaranteed annuity level of payments F’ = B  + So in 
the  hypothetical extreme case in  which  social security benefits  are 
actually sold to the employer, in the integrated plan, the worker receives 
F  + max(0, ST - F)  as his annuity at retirement.  Thus, unlike the 
hypothetical sale in which the employer receives ST + B in exchange 
for the guaranteed floor, F, the employer actually receives min(F,S,  + 
B),  which is always less than or equal to ST + B.  For the nonintegrated 
and corresponding integrated plans in table 6.3 to have equal present 
value of costs it must therefore be the case that the floor promised 
under the integrated plan not exceed the guaranteed annuity in the case 
of an outright sale, that is, F 5  F’ = So + B. Thus column 3 provides 
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there is no chance that  ST  will exceed  So + B  then F  = So  + B, 
otherwise F will be less than So + B. 
As table 6.3 demonstrates, individuals who would receive small pri- 
vate pension benefits relative to social security in nonintegrated plans 
will be offered a guaranteed combined benefit that is significantly less 
than the current combined benefit. This effect is more pronounced for 
large uncertainty rates (high a)  and for longer times to retirement. At 
the limit of zero private pension benefits, the floor integrated replace- 
ment benefit is zero. In this extreme case, the employer has no obli- 
gations in the nonintegrated scenario and thus the value of the insurance 
(the put) provided by the employer must also be zero. The floor benefit 
guarantee with equivalent present value in the integrated plan is zero, 
and the employer provides no insurance against declines in social se- 
curity benefit levels. As employer-provided nonintegrated benefits in- 
crease, the corresponding floor benefit level rises. For private nonin- 
tegrated pension benefit levels of $100, the employer offers a floor level 
that is significantly below the current (and expected future) level for 
social security of $10,000. The $100 nonintegrated benefit given up by 
the employee to the employer can buy only “disaster” insurance which 
will pay off  only if  social security falls significantly below its current 
level. 
For higher employer-provided pension levels, the minimum benefit 
guarantee rises and indeed can exceed the current level of social se- 
curity of  $10,000. For the highest  employer-provided nonintegrated 
benefit considered in table 6.3 ($lO,OOO),  the employer offers a corre- 
sponding benefit floor in the integrated plan of  $20,000.7 Under the 
posited dynamic process for social security, there is virtually no chance 
that ST  will exceed the $20,000 floor. Thus, almost surely the employer 
will end up paying at T the floor benefit equal to $20,000 and will receive 
the social security benefit, Sp  In effect, the employer has purchased 
the employee’s social security benefit. 
The differences between the combined nonintegrated benefit levels 
and the floor income thus have a straightforward interpretation.  For 
large floors, say greater than twice So,  the social security benefit level 
must double in real terms before the employer fails to capture all the 
benefits from social security. Thus, the employer will almost certainly 
end up receiving the employee’s social security benefit. In this regime, 
the employee has simply sold his rights to social security to the em- 
ployer, who will pay F - ST  in pension benefits at time T. In order to 
provide  the employee with  an integrated benefit level  equal to the 
obligation B in the nonintegrated  plan, the floor level must approxi- 
mately  satisfy F - So = B, or F  = B+ So. Therefore, the benefit 
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declines relative to So there is a significant chance that S,  will be less 
than So+B and therefore as we have seen, the guaranteed minimum 
benefit, F,  must be strictly less than So+B. 
All of  these conclusions assumed that employer-provided benefits 
are fixed in real terms. Table 6.4 provides the same analysis as in table 
6.3, but computed under the assumption suggested by  Bulow (1982) 
that promised employer-provided benefits are fixed in nominal terms. 
Thus, for the same level of nominal benefits, B, the real level of benefits 
must be deflated by the rate of  inflation. An inflation rate of  6% is 
assumed in table 6.4. 
Columns  1  and 2 give the nominal and associated real employer- 
provided benefit levels corresponding to column 1 of table 6.3. For the 
same nominal benefits,  the real benefit levels will, of  course, fall as 
one considers longer times to retirement. Column 3 of table 6.4 presents 
the sum of the $10,000 real social security benefit plus the real employer- 
Table 6.4  Integrated Floor Levels ($) (Nominal Contracting) 
Employer-  Employer-  Real Floor Benefit for 
provided  provided  Total Real  Corresponding Integrated Plan 
Nominal  Real  Nonintegrated  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Benefit  Benefit**  Benefit 





































A. Time to retirement 15 years 
10,000  0 
10,041  9,671 
10,203  10,092 
10,407  10,374 
12,033  12,033* 
14,066  14,066* 
B.  Time to retirement 25 years 
10,000  0 
10,022  9,374 
10,112  9,799 
10,223  10,049 
11,116  11,113 
12,231  12,23  1 * 
10,000  0 
10,012  9,086 
10,061  9,501 
10,122  9,734 
10,612  10,533 
1 1,225  11,225* 





































*Present value of social security payments in excess of the floor is less than $5. 
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provided benefit, while columns 4-6  present real floor benefits for the 
nonintegrated  plan. (Our analysis ignores price level risk; hence, the 
only source of uncertainty is social security risk.) 
The floor benefit levels in table 6.4 are, as expected, lower than those 
in  table  6.3. This pattern  results  from  the  decreased  real  value  of 
employer-provided benefits when those benefits are nominally fixed. 
As is  perhaps  not  surprising, the difference  in  floor levels  is most 
pronounced for high values of IJ  and for panel  C, in which time to 
retirement equals 35 years. In these cases, the floor benefits range from 
approximately 50% to 85% of their corresponding values in table 6.3, 
in which the employer-provided pension benefit is fixed in real terms. 
To  perhaps provide further intuition for the comparative statics re- 
sults presented in tables 6.3 and 6.4, we note that the key expression 
in curly brackets in (8), max (EST),  can be rewritten as F + max(O,S, 
- F).  Max (O,ST - F,  is the functional form of the payoff to a call 
option of  maturity  date T with an exercise price of F on a security 
whose price at time Tis given by Sp  In this formulation, the employee’s 
claim in the integrated plan is equivalent to a risk-free payment of F 
plus an implicit call option to buy back from the employer the social 
security benefit at time T for exercise price F. For large floor levels 
relative to the expected level of social security benefits, the employee’s 
call will be significantly out of the money, and F must be near F‘;  since 
the call is unlikely to be exercised, the floor benefit must approach the 
combined nonintegrated benefit. 
6.4  Extensions of the Model 
In the previous section we used contingent claims analysis to value 
guaranteed replacement rates in a simple one-period model induced by 
the current institutional form of integrated plans. The contingent claims 
approach and the insights it yields are quite flexible, however, and are 
easily extended to handle both more realistic  models of  the current 
system and alternative types of  integrated  plans.  In this section we 
illustrate that flexibility with a few important extensions to the basic 
model. 
As was described in the introduction, the current practice for inte- 
grated plans is to provide only a partial offset for social security pay- 
ments with a maximum of an 83%% offset. It is, however, straightfor- 
ward  to modify the  100% offset  model  of  the  previous  section to 
accommodate this partial offset feature.  If y denotes the fraction of 
offset provided by a specific plan, then the level of life annuity payments 
provided by the employer is given by max (0,F -  yS,).  Thus, as with 
the full offset plan, the structure of the firm’s liability in a partial offset 
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which led to the determination of the minimum guaranteed combined 
income, F, for the full offset plan can be applied to determine the floor 
for the partial offset one. If  F(y)  denotes the floor for a plan with a y 
offset, then from (6), F(y),  will satisfy 
(1  1)  P[F(y),yS,,U = Be-rT. 
Because the value of a put option is an increasing function of its exercise 
price and a decreasing function of the price of its underlying security, 
it follows from (1 1) that dF(y)ldy > 0. Therefore, a partial offset plan 
(y < 1)  will  have a lower guaranteed retirement income level, F(y), 
than a full offset plan (y = 1). A general property of put option prices 
is that they are first-degree homogeneous in these two variables. That 
is, P[F(y),  ySo,Tl = yP[F(y)/y,S,,T].  It follows from (1  1) that the value 
of the put in all comparable integrated plans must equal Be-rT;  therefore 
m-3  F(y)  S  0,  TI  = BcrT  = P[F(l),  So, TI.  Because the value of a put is 
an increasing function of its exercise price, for y < 1 this equality can 
be maintained only if -  2 F(1), or F(y) L yF(1). Hence, although 
the partial offset plan has a lower income floor than a full offset plan, 
it is less than proportionately lower. 
In summary, we can bound the guaranteed retirement income in a 
partial offset plan in terms of the floor level in a corresponding full 
offset plan by 
(12) 
In the previous section, we also assumed that the employer-provided 
benefit is riskless and that the only source of uncertainty is the level 
of  social security payments received in retirement.  A more realistic 
model would take into account that the employer-provided benefit (in 
either the nonintegrated or integrated plan) is also uncertain. However, 
because the payoff structure to the employee in an integrated plan is 
still given by max(F,S,),  the same basic methodology of section 6.3 
can be used to extend the model to this more general case. Fischer 
(1978) has derived a valuation formula for the price of a contingent 
claim whose terminal value is max(F,ST) when both F and ST are sto- 
chastic.  Hence, by replacing P(F,S,,T) in equation (6) by this more 
general valuation formula and reinterpreting Be-rT  in (6) as the present 
value of the uncertain benefit provided in the corresponding noninte- 
grated plan, one could proceed to analyze the impact on risk bearing 
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As a third illustration  of the flexibility of the approach presented 
here, consider the case of an integrated plan in which the employer- 
provided benefit is not fixed after retirement but is adjusted each period 
to reflect post-retirement changes in social security benefits. Despite 
the fact that integrated plans in the United States do not currently work 
this way, this case is of interest for at least two reasons. 
First, many employers do provide post-retirement benefit increases 
even though they are not contractually bound to do so.* These increases 
are typically made on an ad hoc basis, and employers explain their 
rationale as stemming from a concern for maintaining a floor beneath 
the retirement income of their former employees. Indeed, some re- 
searchers view these ad hoc increases as part of an implicit contract 
between employer and employees. Given their expressed purpose, there 
can be little doubt that the magnitude and frequency of these ad hoc 
increases depend on the magnitude and frequency of changes in social 
security benefits. The second reason for examining this case is that 
while formal integration may not work this way right now, it is possible 
that it  might at some point  in the future or in some other national 
setting. This is especially relevant since the normative implications of 
integrated plans have not yet received a full review. 
In this version of an integrated plan, the firm’s obligation at each 
date t during the retirement period equals max(0,F - S,)  so that the 
present value of contingent payments as of time 0 equals 
(13)  J,- Pr(t) P(F, so,  t)dt. 
Given mortality tables for Pr(t), and a formula for P, we can compute 
the level of F by equating the value in (13) to Bh(r)crT  in a way that 
is similar to (6)  in the previous section. By way of example, however, 
we compute the firm’s reservation level for F, given B,  for a particularly 
simple pattern for Pr(t).  Suppose, for example, as described in Merton 
(1983b), that the probability of dying at t is determined by a Poisson- 
distributed random variable with characteristic parameter A. Under this 
assumption, Pr(t) = Ae-”‘; the expected time until death is l/A  and h(r) 
= l/(r + A).  Expression (13) can be written as 
(14)  /i{Fe-(r+A)t[l -  N(d,)] - S,e-@+”)‘[l  - N(d,)l}dt, 
where d,  and d2  were defined in (10). The integral can be approximated 
numerically by setting the upper limit of integration equal to a large 
positive value. One then can search over F for the benefit floor guar- 
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Guaranteed combined benefit rates corresponding to combined in- 
come rates in the nonintegrated plan were computed using (14)  under 
the assumption that 6 = r. For values of A  = .0667 and 6 = .025, and 
times to retirement of  15 and 35 years, we found that benefit floors 
were virtually identical to those in table 6.3.9 
Another issue surrounding integrated plans that requires further study 
and clarification is the procedure  for aggregating the worker’s  total 
private pension benefits when he has worked for more than one em- 
ployer.  For  nonintegrated  plans,  the worker’s total private  pension 
annuity benefit, B’,  is the sum of the annuity benefits earned from all 
plans,  Z?B,, where B, is the  annuity benefit from  employer  i,  i  = 
1, . . . ,n. As noted in the introduction, the typical nonintegrated plan 
determines the retirement benefit in terms of the number of years of 
service to the firm and some type of average salary during that service. 
Hence, as has been widely discussed in the pension literature, for the 
same wage profile, the total private retirement benefit received by a 
worker who participates in more than one nonintegrated  plan will in 
general be different than if he had participated in only one plan for his 
entire work life. 
With integrated plans, the issue of aggregating benefits is consider- 
ably more complex. In addition to the effect on the level of benefits 
found in nonintegrated  plans, the same aggregation procedure when 
applied to integrated plans has a substantial impact on the risk char- 
acteristics of the worker’s total retirement income. 
To illustrate this point, consider two workers both of whom earn the 
same constant wage throughout their work life. Worker 1 has a single 
employer and worker 2 works an equal number of years for each of n 
firms. Under these specialized conditions, worker 1 and worker 2 would 
have the same total retirement income if the plans were nonintegrated. 
That is, worker 1 would receive B‘ and worker 2 would receive B, = 
B’/n from each firm  i,  i =  1, . . . ,n. If, however, each of  the firms’ 
plans is integrated with social security, then the private pension benefits 
to the two workers will be quite different. 
Worker 1 with a single lifetime employer fits the assumed conditions 
of our model in section 6.3. His private pension annuity is given by 
max (0,F -  S,)  where F is determined from the solution of equation 
(6) with B = B‘. This implicit put option insures him against low levels 
of  social security payments by compensating him dollar for dollar for 
payments below F. Hence, he has a total retirement income floor of F. 
If  the minimum guaranteed income floor for each plan  i, F,, is deter- 
mined separately according to (6) with B  = B, = B‘ln, (i = 1. . . ,n), 
then the aggregate private pension  benefit for worker  2 is given by 
C;max[O,F, - S,]  = n max(0,F’ - S,)  where F’  = F, (i=  1, . . . ,n) 
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In effect, worker 2 has been given a put option on his social security 
benefit by each of his employers and therefore has an aggregate of n 
put options on his single social security benefit. Thus, unlike worker 
1’s single put option, once worker 2’s options are “in the money” (i.e., 
ST < F’),  he receives  n  dollars in private annuity benefits for each 
dollar decline in ST below F‘.  He will, therefore, receive a larger total 
retirement income if  ST < F‘ than if  ST = F‘ (which corresponds to 
his minimum retirement income). 
Worker 2, of course, pays for this “extra”  benefit received for very 
low levels of social security. By analysis similar to that used to derive 
(12),  FIn  5 F’  5  F where, in general, F’ << F for n 2 2. Hence, 
worker 2 has no protection against declines in the level of social security 
payments for F‘ 5 ST 5 F whereas worker 1 is “fully insured” in this 
regime. Thus, even for a worker with a large total nonintegrated private 
pension benefit B, the amount of “useful”  insurance provided by in- 
tegrated plans may be rather modest if  the worker has had many em- 
ployers and each Fi << F. 
In summary, for a single-employer worker under an integrated plan, 
the schedule of total first-year retirement income as a function of the 
social security benefit, max(F,ST), exhibits the standard insurance pat- 
tern  of  a “protective  put”  strategy.  In  contrast, the corresponding 
schedule of total income for an n-employer worker, max[nF‘ -  (n - 
l)ST,ST],  is a piecewise linear function of  ST  which is decreasing with 
slope  -(n - 1) for ST < F’; reaches a minimum at ST = F’; and is 
increasing with slope 1 for ST > F‘. 
It is difficult to believe that this “vee-shaped” schedule of retirement 
income for multiple-employer workers is an intended consequence of 
integrated pension plans. Although the normative aspects of integrated 
plans  is not  the  focus of  this paper, our brief  analysis  here  surely 
suggests that a widespread change from nonintegrated to integrated 
plans under current aggregation rules could have a significant and largely 
unintended effect on worker mobility. 
6.5  Summary, Conclusions, and Agenda for Future Research 
Our most robust finding in the previous section can be stated simply 
as follows. For extremely low values of BIS, that is, the ratio of em- 
ployer benefits to social security in the nonintegrated scenario, the 
value of F in the integrated scenario is very low, indicating that inte- 
gration  would not in that  situation provide much  insurance.  At the 
other extreme, for high ratios of employer-provided benefits to social 
security benefits in the nonintegrated  scenario, integration results in 
virtually complete elimination of social security risk through employer 
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One’s position on whether accruing benefits under a defined benefit 
plan are real or nominal thus has a significant impact on the degree of 
risk shedding achieved through integration. If the benefit is real, then 
all but those with virtually no private benefit in the nonintegrated sce- 
nario will by switching to an integrated plan in effect sell all their rights 
to social security. If the benefit is nominal then a greater proportion of 
individuals will retain a claim to at least some meaningful part of the 
distribution of social security benefits after integration. 
Our analysis does not address the issue of whether or not integration 
under the offset plan examined here is desirable. Indeed, under the 
usual assumption of continuously differentiable preference functions, 
one would not expect that a “kinked”  schedule of income-for  ex- 
ample, max (F,S,)-would  be an unconstrained optimum. Such sched- 
ules can, however, be optimal if there are constraints such as that the 
worker  cannot  sell his human  capital.  For  example, under just this 
constraint, Diamond and Mirrlees  (1985) have examined the role of 
transferable private pensions in  improving the risk-sharing opportu- 
nities for workers when they are mobile. As shown in Merton (1985), 
under certain conditions, the Diamond-Mirrlees optimal transferable 
pension schedule is formally identical in structure to the one derived 
here for an integrated pension plan. Hence, neglecting the problems 
associated with worker mobility, a normative study may well find that 
integrated pension plans like those analyzed in sections 6.3 and 6.4 do 
have optimal risk-bearing properties.  If, however, worker mobility is 
taken into account, then based on the analysis in section 6.4, we con- 
jecture that the optimal pension policy will be to integrate all pension 
plans, both private and public. 
Thus, while the focus here has been to highlight what we believe to 
be some of  the unintended consequences of integration in its current 
setting, the analysis also provides a footlight on the trade-offs that are 
likely to be encountered in a normative evaluation of integration. 
One, presumably unintended  consequence of  integration  is that it 
allows for a de facto sale of social security benefits by participants in 
even moderately generous private pension plans.  Our tables suggest 
that for typical profiles this sale is effectively complete despite the de 
jure prohibition  against  such assignment embodied elsewhere in the 
law. A related consequence is that the risk shedding available to those 
with low employer-provided benefits is inferior to that of retirees who 
are more generously provided for. Since low-income individuals gen- 
erally also have the lowest pension benefits relative to social security, 
this risk-sharing pattern would appear to be somewhat regressive. Fi- 
nally, we note our finding that integrated plans have unintended con- 
sequences for worker mobility beyond those already identified for non- 
integrated plans. 167  Pension Plan Integration As Insurance Against Social Security Risk 
The analysis in this paper is our first step in exploring the issue of 
integration of employer-provided pensions as a means of insuring work- 
ers against retirement income risk. In addition to the normative analysis 
already noted, there are a number of extensions of the analysis which 
are on our agenda for future research. 
First of these is to perform a study similar to the one presented here 
for excess plans, and in particular for defined contribution excess plans. 
Second, we plan to examine in greater depth the nature of social se- 
curity risk and how it affects the value of the insurance provided through 
plan integration.  For example, uncertainty regarding  social security 
benefits, which are determined in large part through the political pro- 
cess, is not likely to be the same across all income levels. 
As described briefly in section 6.4, a third obvious extension is to 
deal explicitly with other sources of retirement income risk in addition 
to social security and to see how they interact under plan integration. 
One major factor is inflation risk. Since the employer-provided benefit 
is usually fixed in nominal terms at least after retirement, its real value 
is risky because of  price-level uncertainty. The latter risk can be re- 
duced and indeed entirely eliminated through indexation, and a con- 
siderable literature on this issue already  exists.  lo We  therefore have 
chosen to ignore this issue in this paper, focusing exclusively on social 
security risk and integration. However, there clearly is an interaction 
between inflation risk and social security risk, and any full analysis of 
the issues of  integration  and indexation would have to consider the 
interaction between the two. 
Fourth, we have considered only social security benefits and the risk 
associated with them and have ignored social security taxes or contri- 
butions. Clearly, changes in social security benefits in the future imply 
changes in social security contributions under the pay-as-you-go fund- 
ing system currently in place. In that sense our model is partial equi- 
librium in its analysis of the changes in risk sharing between employer 
and worker. Future research will take account of the feedback between 
benefit changes and contribution changes in the future in assessing the 
risk profiles resulting from integration. 
Finally, our model and the option pricing methodology which we 
have applied have clear implications for the actuarial methods used to 
cost integrated pension plans. To  our knowledge the actuarial profes- 
sion does not currently employ this methodology, and we plan to ex- 
plore the implications of its use in a more detailed setting than the one 
used in this paper. 168  Robert C. Merton, Zvi Bodie, and Alan J. Marcus 
Notes 
1. See Schulz and Leavitt (1983), p. 26. According to the 1980 Bankers Trust 
Survey as many as 87% of private defined benefit plans with pay-related for- 
mulas were integrated. 
2. For an explanation of options and how they work, see the seminal paper 
by  Black and  Scholes (1973). For a  survey of  the options literature and its 
application to nontraded assets, see Mason and Merton (1984). Because social 
security benefits change over time, while employer-provided benefits in inte- 
grated plans are linked to the level of social security at the time of retirement 
and are not thereafter adjusted, employees might engage in strategic retirement 
behavior.  For  example, it  might pay  to retire  immediately prior to a large 
increase in social security benefits, so as to obtain larger private pension ben- 
efits. This gaming issue is absent from our analysis, because we set the re- 
tirement  date exogenously. However, strategic behavior  could easily  be  in- 
corporated into the analysis.  If  retirement  dates are chosen by  optimizing 
employees, then the implicit option conferred to employees is simply American 
rather than  European. While  closed-form  solutions  for the values  of  these 
options are generally unavailable, the exercise decision is well understood and 
several numerical valuation algorithms are available to value such options. 
3. For a further discussion of the analogy between put options and insurance 
schemes, see Merton et al. (1982). 
4.  The quantitative  properties of integrated  plans  can be  sensitive  to the 
particular stochastic  process assumed for S. However, the important qualitative 
properties of integration are independent of the particular process postulated. 
Geometric Brownian motion is the prototype process examined in the finance 
literature and has the benefits of familiarity and simplicity. 
5. For a full presentation of the view of defined benefit pension accruals as 
a nominal asset see Bulow (1982).  For a good discussion of why they might 
best be viewed as real see Cohn and Modigliani (1983). 
6.  If  the uncertainty  surrounding  the real  value of  future social  security 
payments is diversifiable, then (Y also equals r, and the actual expected growth 
rate g is zero. If 01  exceeds r because of a risk premium associated with social 
security uncertainty, then g = (Y -  r >  0, and col. 3 is interpreted as the “risk- 
corrected” or “certainty-equivalent”  expected level of total benefits. 
7. The entries in col. 4 are accurate to $5. Floor levels equal to col. 3 thus 
result from rounding error. Actual floor levels must be somewhat less than the 
corresponding entry in col. 3. 
8. See, for example, Clark et al. (1983). 
9. We  set the upper limit of the integral in (14) equal to 40 years. The value 
of  the sum of  the integrand  using  yearly  increments for dt  was no  longer 
increasing noticeably at this point. 
10. See, for example, Feldstein  (1983), Summers  (1983), and Bodie  and 
Pesando (1983). 
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Comment  Jeremy I. Bulow 
This paper introduces two important issues to the NBER’s discussion 
of private pensions. The first is the issue of  social security integration, 
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and the second is the role of risk sharing in determining pensions and 
other benefits. 
A majority of private defined benefit pension plans are integrated, 
and this integration has many consequences. First, as Robert Merton 
pointed out in his discussion, the integration  of  social security with 
growing private pension  benefits may alter the political interests of 
various groups in “protecting” the social security system. For example, 
workers aged 50-65  might care less if social security were cut, if their 
benefits were effectively insured by their employers. 
There is a major qualification to this argument, however. The way 
integration works, once an employee is retired and drawing a private 
pension benefit, that benefit cannot be reduced by increases in social 
security benefits. Therefore already retired employees would still be 
just as badly hurt by any cut in the growth of nominal benefits as if 
there were no integration. 
A second important characteristic of integration is that it is a major 
neglected issue in the general area of pension liability valuation. With 
nonintegrated plans we have some reasonably well-developed theories 
of how to value employee benefits, theories that do not depend heavily 
on projections of  the future. However, if  benefits are tied  to social 
security, then projections must  be made about what  social security 
benefit levels will be in the future and how integration rules may change. 
That is, if a worker in an integrated plan were to quit the firm today 
we cannot estimate the present value of  that worker’s future private 
pension benefits without making projections about social security. 
Third, social security integration introduces a related, equally im- 
portant issue.  Firms provide health  benefits to retired  workers that 
insure against costs not paid by medicare. Such firms bear the same 
kind of risk in their medical programs that integration brings with social 
security. The methods of analyzing the social security problem should 
thus be readily applicable to another, equally important problem. These 
two primary  retirement benefits  are special because  changes in  the 
rules which raise firms’ costs cannot be balanced by offering employees 
lower salaries. About the only hedge that firms readily have against 
such changes is the ability to cut down on voluntary benefit increases 
for retirees if some increases are mandated by law. 
Why do firms integrate their pension plans? Perhaps the two most 
commonly given reasons are what might be called “non-economist” 
reasons. First, some firms may simply wish to deceive unknowledge- 
able  employees into believing they  are accruing  a  valuable  private 
pension benefit when in reality the workers will get very little because 
of  the mathematics of  integration. Second, there  is  some notion  of 
“equity”  in pension benefit replacement rates. If the objective of pri- 
vate pensions is to provide workers with an adequate pension, defined 171  Pension Plan Integration As Insurance Against Social Security Risk 
as some percentage of  pre-retirement income, then integration  may 
help attain that goal by smoothing total replacement rates. 
The deception issue mentioned above is one which we economists 
are poorly equipped to discuss. The “pension adequacy” issue of the 
firm desiring to provide target replacement rates seems dubious for 
two reasons: 
First, as economists, we tend to believe that private pay arrange- 
ments are determined largely by market considerations, not equity. We 
believe that workers negotiate compensation packages, and efficiency 
requires that the reason compensation comes in a particular form is 
that given the cost to the firm of a pay package the compensation must 
be distributed to maximize worker utility. As the authors point out, the 
discussion should center on why workers choose to take their com- 
pensation in a given form, rather than on what is an equitable pension 
benefit. 
Second, given that highly paid  workers will generally  have more 
wealth  and  at least  somewhat greater  social  security benefits  upon 
retirement, it is not so obvious that “equity”  would require the tre- 
mendous skewing of private pension benefits to highly paid workers 
that occurs with integration. 
The authors suggest a third reason for integration, one that is con- 
sistent with economic thinking. They propose that integration may be 
employed for its favorable risk-sharing consequences. In their model, 
low-paid workers essentially have no private pension and bear the risk 
of changes in their social security benefits. Wealthier workers sell their 
social security benefit to the firm and are thus hedged (ignoring taxes) 
for changes in the value of their benefits. The authors argue that it is 
reasonable for more highly paid workers to have a greater interest in 
insuring against social security benefits because those workers prob- 
ably  have the greatest  uncertainty  about what  their  social  security 
benefits will be. 
There is a major difficulty with the notion of integration’s primary 
purpose being to share risks efficiently. While there is some risk in 
social security wealth this risk would  seem to be less than in most 
other forms of  investment for retirement.  Workers hold nominal an- 
nuities through defined contribution pension plans and thus bear infla- 
tion risk. We  do not see workers demanding real instead of  nominal 
private pensions. The employees who would be insuring against social 
security risK with integration-higher-paid  retired salaried employees- 
also own a good deal of stock, which is vastly riskier than social security 
wealth. Thus it seems doubtful that risk sharing in social security would 
be of major importance to these employees. 
Why then do firms have integrated plans? Probably the primary rea- 
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low-paid workers might not want much of their compensation in the 
form of a private pension while highly paid workers may favor deferred 
compensation. First, highly paid workers may have a bigger tax in- 
centive to “smooth” taxable income than lower- paid workers. Second, 
the desirability of having the firm invest money in  a pension account 
at a pre-tax rate of return is greater for workers in a high tax bracket. 
Third, because social security payments do replace a higher percentage 
of working income for lower-paid employees lifetime smoothing would 
dictate  more  non-social  security  retirement  saving for  highly  paid 
workers. 
ERISA has nondiscrimination provisions which limit the degree to 
which benefits can be skewed to highly paid employees. The way that 
firms can most effectively discriminate between high-paid and low-paid 
workers is by having an integrated plan. As the authors show, such 
plans will have a much higher ratio of private benefits for highly paid 
versus lower-paid workers than nonintegrated plans. I suspect that the 
true motivation for integration is to achieve a greater skewing of ben- 
efits than may be possible with nonintegrated plans. 
In summary, the authors have introduced some important issues to 
our study of  private pensions. They are correct in looking at social 
security integration in the context of maximizing economic behavior 
rather than in an “equity”  context. However, I am not yet convinced 
that risk sharing is really an important consideration in establishing an 
integrated private pension plan. 